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THE EFFECT OF PROPRIETARY AND 
ATTRIBUTION CLAIMS ON DATA 
SHARING  
DURING INFECTIOUS DISEASE 
EMERGENCIES+ 
SAM HALABI, J.D., MPHIL*, MICHELLE ROURKE, PHD**, REBECCA KATZ, PHD, 
MPH***  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Responding to infectious disease emergencies is critically dependent upon 
the collection, analysis, and sharing of relevant data.1 These data include clinical, 
epidemiological, laboratory, surveillance, emergency response, geospatial, 
health facility data, knowledge, attitude and practices surveys, and pathogen 
genetic sequences.2 In contexts where the pathogen is unknown, or where there 
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 1. Katrina Hedberg & Julie Maher, Collecting Data, in THE CDC FIELD EPIDEMIOLOGY MANUAL 
Ch. 4 (Sonia A. Rasmussen & Richard A. Goodman eds., 2018). 
 2. See generally Shweta Bansal et al., Big Data for Infectious Disease Surveillance and Modeling. 
214 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES S375, S3575-79 (2016) (explaining how the field of infectious disease 
research is affected by big data). 
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is no licensed biomedical intervention, relevant data also includes results from 
research into diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines.3 Recent infectious disease 
emergencies, including and perhaps especially the COVID-19 pandemic, have 
demonstrated that commercial and scientific proprietary claims have impeded 
critical data sharing.4 These claims are based on an incoherent patchwork of legal 
and ethical guidelines that often deteriorate in the face of infectious disease 
emergencies, creating major barriers to data sharing.5 These problems are 
exacerbated by some of the current incentives put in place by governments, 
funders, and medical journals.6 As we are witnessing today, climate change, 
urbanization and conflict are factors contributing to the emergence of novel 
pathogens that are likely to threaten human health security, it is crucial to identify 
the legal, social, and ethical barriers to data sharing and construct solutions to 
them now, before responders are in the midst of an infectious disease 
emergency.7  
Supported by the Wellcome Trust and the Global Research Collaboration 
for Infectious Disease Preparedness (GloPID-R), in 2018 we undertook 
comprehensive literature reviews and anonymized interviews with aid workers, 
anthropologists, clinicians, data scientists, funders, epidemiologists, journalists, 
and researchers at for-profit and non-profit biomedical research organizations to 
assess data sharing barriers experienced during the 2012 Middle East respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) outbreak in Saudi Arabia8 and the 2014-16 
West Africa Ebola public health emergency.9 The project aimed to assess the 
legal, regulatory, administrative, ethical, technological, and cultural variables 
that facilitated or obstructed data sharing during the outbreak and research 
response in order to identify opportunities to enhance data sharing in future 
 
 3.  See generally id. 
 4.  See generally Paul David, The Economic Logic of “Open Science” and the Balance Between 
Private Property Rights and the Public Domain in Scientific Data and Information: A Primer, THE 
ROLE OF SCI. AND TECH. DATA AND INFO. IN THE PUB. DOMAIN: PROC. OF A SYMP. (2003) (describing 
the conflict between incentives for cooperative vs. non-cooperative behavior in scientific and 
technological fields); see also Michelle Rourke et al., Policy Opportunities to Enhance Sharing for 
Pandemic Research, 368 SCIENCE 716 (2020). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  INST. OF MED., THE INFLUENCE OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE ON INFECTIOUS 
DISEASE DYNAMICS 10-11, 39, 42-44, 53-63 (2014). 
 8.  CTR. FOR GLOB. HEALTH SCI. AND SEC., MERS-COV DATA SHARING CASE STUDY REPORT, 
GEO. UNIV. MED. CTR. (2018), http://www.glopid-r.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/07/Georgetown_MERS-Case-Study-Report-1.pdf [hereinafter MERS-CoV Case 
Study]. 
 9.  CTR. FOR GLOB. HEALTH SCI. AND SEC., DATA SHARING DURING THE WEST AFRICA EBOLA 
PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY: CASE STUDY REPORT, GEO. UNIV. MED. CTR. (Nov.2018), 
http://www.glopid-r.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/data-sharing-during-west-africa-ebola-public-
health-emergency-case-study-report-georgetown.pdf [hereinafter West Africa Ebola Case Study]. 
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outbreaks. The full project reports outlining the case study methodology can be 
found on the GloPID-R website.10 
Our case studies revealed that while some data sharing barriers were unique 
to geopolitical context (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone had among the world’s 
weakest health infrastructures)11 or political environment (Saudi Arabia used 
press controls to limit awareness of its MERS-CoV outbreak),12 the most 
significant barriers to data sharing were common to both situations, embedded 
in legal conceptions (and misconceptions) of ownership and attribution and 
ethical ambiguities surrounding emergency research ethics (e.g., to whom ethical 
duties were owed, when those duties were eased by a humanitarian emergency, 
and how grievances for breaches of ethics might be brought and resolved).13 In 
both the MERS-CoV and Ebola case studies, researchers feared that sharing data 
early and informally would jeopardize the attribution required for professional 
advancement, the novelty for publication in high-impact journals or patent 
applications, or the contracts with their funders.14  For-profit firms worried that 
sharing data, especially inconclusive or adverse results, might threaten 
investments for medical countermeasures that, while ineffective against Ebola or 
MERS-CoV, might have promise against other pathogens.15 
This article provides an overview of our case studies that identified critical 
gaps in the law and ethics of data sharing during public health emergencies.16 
Using the 2012 outbreak of MERS-CoV in Saudi Arabia and the 2014-16 West 
Africa Ebola public health emergency, our case studies revealed that proprietary 
and attribution-oriented claims represent critical barriers to sharing data relevant 
to effective response, and we recommend ways to lower those barriers.17 Part II  
of this article provides an overview of our analysis of the 2012 outbreak of 
MERS-CoV in Saudi Arabia.18 Part III analyzes the 2014-16 West Africa Ebola 
public health emergency.19 Part IV recommends solutions to data sharing barriers 
identified in Parts II and III.20 Part V provides a conclusion and brief reflections 
on these issues in relation to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.21 
 
 10. MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8; West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9. 
 11.  See generally Health Systems Situation in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, WHO (Dec. 10-
11, 2014)  https://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/health-systems/health-systems-ppt1.pdf?ua=1 
(asserting that Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have poor health infrastructure). 
 12.  See infra Part II.e. 
 13.  Jean-Paul Chretien et al., Make Data Sharing Routine to Prepare for Public Health 
Emergencies, PLOS MED. 1, 1-4 (2016). 
 14.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8; West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9. 
 15.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 11, 13, 25. 
 16.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8; West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9. 
 17.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8; West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9. 
 18.  See infra Part II. 
 19.  See infra Part III. 
 20.  See infra Part IV. 
 21.  See infra Part V. 
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II. MERS-COV 
This Part will describe the discovery of the virus that causes MERS-CoV, 
the outbreak that ensued, and barriers to sharing data relevant to researching the 
new pathogen and responding to the infectious disease emergency. These 
barriers included proprietary claims over the virus and related genetic material, 
demands for authorship and attribution by governmental officials, and press 
controls imposed by the Saudi government. The MERS-CoV episode identifies 
factors that are inherent within the scientific process as it now prevails as well as 
the responsibilities of governments in the context of sharing data during 
infectious disease emergencies. 
a. Background 
In September 2012, Dr. Ali Mohamed Zaki, an Egyptian physician working 
in Saudi Arabia, reported the isolation of a new betacoronavirus he suspected 
had caused the severe respiratory symptoms, renal failure, and death of a 
patient.22 Later dubbed the “Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus” 
(MERS-CoV), this emerging infectious disease has now been responsible for 
more than 2,200 laboratory-confirmed infections in people from 27 countries, 
and close to 800 deaths.23 The vast majority of these cases have been recorded in 
Saudi Arabia; however, MERS-CoV is considered a severe emerging disease 
with the potential to cause a major global health emergency.24 With a case fatality 
rate of around 35%, and no specific treatments or vaccines, MERS-CoV remains 
a global research and development priority.25  
Epidemiological investigations have revealed that primary human 
infections with MERS-CoV are often, but not always, associated with contact 
 
 22.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 1 (citing to Email from Dr. Ali Mohamed Zaki, 
Professor of Microbiology, Virology Lab of Dr. Soliman Fakeeh Hosp. Jeddah Sudai Arabia, to ProMed 
(Sept. 15, 2012, 15:51:26), http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=1302733; Ali M. Zaki et al., 
Isolation of a Novel Coronavirus From a Man With Pneumonia in Saudi Arabia, PUBMED.GOV (Nov. 8, 
2012), HTTPS://PUBMED.NCBI.NLM.NIH.GOV/23075143/). 
 23.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 1 (citing to Raoul J. de Groot et al., Middle East 
Respiratory Synfrom Coronavirus (MERS-CoV): Announcement of the Coronavirus Study Group, 87 J. 
VIROL. 7790 (2013); MERS Situation Update, June 2018, WHO. REG’L OFFICE E. MEDITERRANEAN, 
http://www.emro.who.int/pandemic-epidemic-diseases/mers-cov/mers-situation-update-june-2018.html 
(last updated June 2018). 
 24. MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 1 (citing to 2018 Annual Review of Diseases 
Prioritized Under the Research and Development Blueprint, WHO 2 (Feb. 6-7, 2018), 
http://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/2018prioritization-report.pdf?ua=1). 
 25. MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 1 (citing to MERS Situation Update, June 2018, 
WHO. REG’L OFFICE E. MEDITERRANEAN, http://www.emro.who.int/pandemic-epidemic-diseases/mers-
cov/mers-situation-update-june-2018.html (last updated June 2018); 2018 Annual Review of Diseases 
Prioritized Under the Research and Development Blueprint, WHO 2 (Feb. 6-7, 2018), 
http://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/2018prioritization-report.pdf?ua=1). 
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with dromedary camels around the Arabian Peninsula.26 Human-to-human 
transmission of MERS-CoV has been responsible for case clusters in family 
groups and healthcare facilities.27 The incidence of hospital-acquired infections 
has been reduced with the employment of strict infection control measures, and 
the international public health community remains on high alert for new 
introductions.28 
Investigations into the initial MERS outbreak in Saudi Arabia were said to 
be “marked by bitter disagreements between public health authorities and 
scientists about the virus’s discovery and the ensuing publications, processes, 
and patenting of products.”29 In their statement regarding the tenth meeting of 
the International Health Regulations (IHR) Emergency Committee regarding 
MERS in September 2015, three years after the first case was reported, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) stated that “[t]imely sharing of detailed information 
of public health importance, including from research studies conducted in the 
affected countries, and virological surveillance, remains limited and has fallen 
short of expectations.”30  
As an emerging pathogen first discovered less than a decade ago, the 
outbreak of MERS-CoV is an insightful case study for contemporaneous data 
sharing practices during public health emergencies.31 The research response in 
the early days of the outbreak involved the isolation and identification of the 
novel coronavirus, epidemiological investigations, and the development of 
diagnostics.32 Later stages of the research response are ongoing and involve 
investigations into viral pathogenesis, the animal reservoir species, transmission 
dynamics, the efficacy of known antiviral drugs against MERS-CoV, and the 
development and testing of vaccines.33  
The early data sharing practices associated with the MERS-CoV research 
response were plagued by many of the same problems encountered during other 
public health emergencies.34 There were problems associated with: (a) ill-defined 
 
 26.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 1 (citing to Manal Al-Gethamy et al., A Case of 
Long-Term Excretion and Subclinical Infection with Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus in 
a Healthcare Worker, 60 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 973 (2015)). 
 27.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 1. 
 28. MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 1 (citing to WHO MERS-CoV Global Summary and 
Assessment of Risk, WHO 1 (July 21, 2017), http://www.who.int/emergencies/mers-cov/risk-
assessment-july-2017.pdf?ua=1). 
 29.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 1 (citing to Scott J. N. McNabb et al., Triumphs, 
Trials, and Tribulations of the Global Response to MERS Coronavirus, 2 LANCET 436 (2014)). 
 30.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 1 (citing to WHO Statement on the Tenth Meeting of 
the IHR Emergency Committee Regarding MERS, WHO (Sept. 3, 2015), 
https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2015/ihr-emergency-committee-mers/en/). 
 31.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 2. 
 32.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 2. 
 33.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 2. 
 34.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 2. 
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norms around data sharing, (b) uncertainty about which parties were responsible 
for sharing certain data and who should bear the associated costs of data curation 
and maintenance, (c) intellectual property considerations, (d) pressure to publish 
in scientific journals before data was released to the public, (e) technical barriers 
associated with appropriately disseminating and securing the data, and (f) 
concerns about data reliability and suitability.35 There were also data and 
information sharing issues that were specific to the MERS outbreak and research 
response precisely because it is a newly emerging pathogen.36 For instance, there 
were disputes between parties trying to exercise competing legal rights over the 
MERS virus and controlling access to virus samples, and there were cultural 
factors that impacted how data were collected and disseminated.37 
b. Proprietary Claims by Scientists and Governments 
Biological samples play an essential role in the development of public 
health data.38 Virus isolates are required to identify the pathogen, develop 
diagnostics and vaccines, and generate genetic sequence data.39 That genetic 
sequence data can be used to monitor pathogen evolution, identify genetic 
determinants of virulence, pathogenicity and transmissibility, and to find 
potential targets for drugs.40 Phylogenetic analyses on these data can help to 
elucidate transmission patterns.41 There is an ongoing requirement for novel 
virus samples as the outbreak progresses (this is particularly important for RNA 
viruses like coronaviruses) to monitor pathogen evolution and detect the 
development of drug resistance.42 Human serum samples are required to measure 
neutralizing antibody titers, develop serological assays and to estimate what 
proportion of the population may have been exposed to the pathogen.43 For any 
emerging pathogens with a likely zoonotic reservoir, samples will also be 
required from animals to determine the host species, exposure rates, and the 
chain of transmission.44 Biological samples are the essential progenitor of so 
much data that access to samples is of critical importance in the discussion on 
data sharing.45 
Investigations into the initial MERS-CoV outbreak in Saudi Arabia were 
said to be “marked by bitter disagreements between public health authorities and 
 
 35.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 2. 
 36.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 2. 
 37.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 2. 
 38.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 8. 
 39.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 8. 
 40.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 8. 
 41.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8 at 8. 
 42.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 8-9. 
 43.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 9. 
 44.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 9. 
 45.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 9. 
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scientists about the virus’ discovery and the ensuing publications, processes, and 
patenting of products.”46After encountering difficulties identifying the causative 
agent for his patient’s illness, Dr Zaki sent a clinical specimen to Erasmus 
Medical Centre in the Netherlands in June 2012.47 The Erasmus team isolated 
and sequenced the novel coronavirus and Dr Zaki reported the details of this 
discovery to ProMED-mail on September 15, 2012.48 The report was publicly 
posted to ProMED-mail on September 20th.49 On September 23rd, the team at 
Erasmus, along with Dr. Zaki, applied for a patent claiming “the nucleic acid 
and/or amino acid sequences of the MERS-CoV genome” as well as “diagnostic 
means and methods, prophylactic means and methods and therapeutic means and 
methods.”50 The Saudi government contested the claims and asserted their 
country’s rights to the virus, as well as attributive rights derivative of the virus, 
including to publications.51 Scientists reported halting research on MERS-CoV 
altogether after the legal terrain became fraught from competing ownership 
claims.52 These competing claims – the patent application claiming the genetic 
sequence of MERS-CoV by Erasmus Medical Center and the sovereignty-like 
claim over MERS-CoV samples by Saudi Arabia – created a climate of confusion 
and fear of legal action if research and development (R&D) activities impinged 
on such rights.53  
Our case study revealed that the action of applying for a patent on the 
genetic sequence of the virus presented both perceived and real barriers to data 
sharing.54 Although patenting the genetic sequence of a virus is not the same as 
owning the virus, the perception was that valuable derivatives were at stake.55 In 
a press release from May 2013, Erasmus Medical Center stated “[i]t is clearly a 
misunderstanding that Erasmus [Medical Center] owns the virus. Only specific 
 
 46.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 1 (citing to Scott J. N. McNabb et al., Triumphs, 
Trials, and Tribulations of the Global Response to MERS Coronavirus, 2 LANCET 436, 436 (2014)). 
 47.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 9 (citing to Kai Kupferschmidt, As Outbreak 
Continues, Confusions Reigns Over Virus Patents, SCIENCE MAGAZINE (May 28, 2013) 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2013/05/outbreak-continues-confusion-reigns-over-virus-patents). 
 48.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 9 (citing to Email from Dr. Ali Mohamed Zaki, 
Professor of Microbiology, Virology Lab of Dr. Soliman Fakeeh Hosp. Jeddah Sudai Arabia, to ProMed 
(Sept. 15, 2012, 15:51:26), http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=1302733). 
 49.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 9 (citing to Email from Dr. Ali Mohamed Zaki, 
Professor of Microbiology, Virology Lab of Dr. Soliman Fakeeh Hosp. Jeddah Sudai Arabia, to ProMed 
(Sept. 15, 2012, 15:51:26), http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=1302733). 
 50.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 9 (citing to U.S. Patent No. 2015/0275183 A1 (filed 
Sept. 23, 2012). 
 51.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 10. 
 52.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 11. 
 53.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 9 (citing to U.S. Patent No. 2015/0275183 A1 (filed 
Sept. 23, 2012)). 
 54.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 9.  
 55.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 9. 
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applications related to it, like vaccines and medicines can be patented.”56 
However, confusion is understandable as the patent application (WO 
2014/045254 A2), sought just days after MERS was first reported, claims “the 
nucleic acid and/or amino acid sequences of the MERS-CoV genome and 
sequences specifically encoding (parts of) viral proteins and antigenic 
polypeptides” as well as “diagnostic means and methods, prophylactic means 
and methods and therapeutic means and methods.”57 Even before the recent court 
challenges to gene patent eligibility around the world (e.g., the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 2013 and the High Court of Australia in 2015; noting that isolated gene 
sequences are still patentable in Europe), the suite of protections afforded patent 
holders of isolated gene sequences was unclear.58 The extension of intellectual 
property rights over the MERS virus introduced an unsettling level of uncertainty 
for scientists who wanted to conduct research on MERS-CoV, and especially for 
those parties with a view to commercializing diagnostics, vaccines and 
medications.59  
The practice of patenting virus sequence data was not unprecedented, or 
uncommon, even during health emergencies. The SARS virus, for example, was 
the subject of multiple patent applications from scientists in Canada, the U.S., 
and Hong Kong during the outbreak in 2003.60 Ultimately, the resulting patent 
pool was managed by the WHO.61 But, the global context had changed somewhat 
since the SARS outbreak in 2003, and the sovereign rights of nation states over 
their genetic resources (which included pathogens as highlighted by Indonesia in 
2006-2007) was top of mind for many countries.62 The Saudis voiced strong 
disapproval and during the World Health Assembly in May 2013,  Dr Margaret 
Chan, then Director-General of the WHO, said of the Erasmus patent application 
 
 56. MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 9 (citing to Press Release, Erasmus Med. Ctr., 
Erasmus MC: No Restrictions for Public Health Research into MERS Coronavirus (May 23, 2013) 
(https://www6.erasmusmc.nl/perskamer/archief/2013/4164294/)). 
 57. MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 9 (citing to U.S. Patent No. 2015/0275183 A1 (filed 
Sept. 23, 2012)). 
 58. Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013); D’Arcy v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc. & ANOR [2015 HCA 35];, MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 9; see 
generally ANDREW STEWART ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AUSTRALIA (6th ed. 2018). 
 59.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 9. 
 60.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 10 (citing to Press Release, Erasmus Med. Ctr., 
Erasmus MC: No Restrictions for Public Health Research into MERS Coronavirus (May 23, 2013) 
(https://www6.erasmusmc.nl/perskamer/archief/2013/4164294/)). 
 61. MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 10; see also Matthew Rimmer, The Race to Patent the 
SARS Virus: The TRIPS Agreement and ACCESS to Essential Medicines, 5 MELB. J. OF INT’L L. 335-74 
(2004). 
 62. MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 10; see Sam F. Halabi, Viral Sovereignity, Intellectual 
Property, and the Changing Global System for Sharing Pathogens for Infectious Disease Research, 28 
ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 101, 104, 114-15 (2019); see also Michelle F. Rourke, Viruses for Sale: All 
Viruses Are Subject to Access and Benefit-Sharing Obligations Under the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 39 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 6, 20, 25-26 (2017).  
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that she would “follow it up,” adding, “I will look at the legal implications 
together with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. No [intellectual property] should 
stand in the way of you, the countries of the world, to protect your people.”63  
The views expressed by the interviewees on the issue of virus access and 
ownership ranged the spectrum.64 Some were indifferent as to the practice of 
patenting virus sequences and others sympathized with the Saudi government.65 
Both sets of legal rights are still rather nebulous, and this undoubtedly led to 
confusion about what research was permissible during the response to MERS-
CoV.66 During a health crisis, there is little time to negotiate access agreements 
or challenge property rights in a court of law.67 Scientific researchers are hesitant 
to conduct R&D if they sense it could result in legal action and/or reputational 
damage.68 This is especially so for researchers looking to develop diagnostics, 
vaccines and medications for the market as competing legal interests could 
jeopardize their R&D investment.69 The bottom line is that this confusion stifled 
the research response and these legal ambiguities must be clarified to reduce 
barriers generating and accessing data and information during public health 
emergencies.70 
c. The Publishing Imperative  
Related to proprietary claims is the role of academic attribution and 
ownership. The pressure to publish in academic journals is an important barrier 
to data sharing during public health emergencies.71 The desire to be the first to 
publish, fear of being scooped, and the requirement to have an impressive 
publication record for career progression create incentives for scientists to 
withhold research data until they can be guaranteed attribution.72 These fears and 
desires are magnified in public health emergencies because the outbreak of a 
novel pathogen provides a unique opportunity to conduct truly groundbreaking 
research.73  
 
 63. MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 9 (citing to WHO Urges Information Sharing Over 
Novel Coronavirus, BBC HEALTH NEWS (May 24, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/health-22649922). 
 64.  See MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 11 (discussing viewpoints of interviewees).  
 65.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 11. 
 66.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 11. 
 67.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 11. 
 68.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 11. 
 69.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 11. 
 70.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 11. 
 71.  See MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 13 (highlighting interviewees’ perception of the 
incentive to publish, particularly during public health crises). 
 72.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 13. 
 73.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 13. 
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One key delay to publishing in journals during the MERS-CoV response 
were authorship disputes by both researchers and the Saudi government.74  
In off-the-record conversations […] a number of scientists 
complained the Saudi deputy health minister in the early days of 
MERS […] was keen to maintain control over data, specimens and 
access, and to be named a prominent author of any scientific papers 
that emerged. In the first couple of years of MERS research, the 
publications section of [his] CV mushroomed.75  
Indeed, the outbreak highlighted the variance in academic cultures with 
respect to ethical criteria to be applied for authorship. In order to be named an 
author under principles set forth by the International Committee of Medical 
Journal Editors, a researcher would have to have made: (a) “substantial 
contributions to the conception or design of the work or the acquisition, analysis, 
or interpretation of data for the work”; (b) have “draft[ed] the work or revis[ed] 
it critically for important intellectual content”; (c) have authority to approve the 
final version to be published; and (d) agree to be accountable for all aspects of 
the work.76 But, in many countries, especially those where laboratories are scarce 
and access to technology is limited, playing roles in data collection, analysis, or 
administrative assistance is often sufficient for authorship recognition.77 During 
the initial outbreak and research response to MERS-CoV, some scientists 
resisted authorship and attribution demands, and, when they did so, faced 
limitations on access to data and biological samples.78 
d. Incongruities in Patient Data Collection 
Attitudes to illness and medical care vary across countries and this can play 
a role in the approach of clinicians taking patients’ medical histories and the sorts 
of information the patients themselves divulge.79 Patients may not realize the 
sorts of information that are useful to clinicians and investigators taking medical 
histories.80 Particularly with a novel pathogen, it can be difficult to determine 
 
 74.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 13. 
 75.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 13 (citing to Helen Branswell, MERS’s Best Friend is 
Ignorance, So It’s Time to Wise Up, THE NEW HUMANITARIAN (June 16, 2015), 
http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2015/06/16/mers-s-best-friend-ignorance-so-it-s-time-
wise). 
 76.  Defining the Role of Authors and Contributors, INT’L COMMITTEE OF MED. J. EDITORS, 
http://www.icmje.org/recommendations/browse/roles-and-responsibilities/defining-the-role-of-authors-
and-contributors.html (last visited Feb 29, 2020). 
 77.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 13-14. 
 78.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 13-14. 
 79. MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 7 (citing to Jyh-Gang Hsieh et al., An Anthropological 
Approach to Teach and Evaluate Cultural Competence in Medical Students – The Application of Mini-
Ethnography in Medical History Taking, 21 MED EDUC. ONLINE 1,4–5 (2016)). 
 80.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 8. 
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what line of questioning will produce relevant answers.81 If a patient is not aware 
of the significance of their personal circumstances, they are very unlikely to 
freely offer any uncomfortable or embarrassing personal information.82 This 
highlights the importance of taking an open-minded approach to collecting 
medical histories and information in the early days of a novel infectious disease 
outbreak.83 If possible, it is always better to collect more data than is thought 
necessary.84 This also underscores the importance of maintaining patient 
confidentiality and anonymizing data so that individuals and communities are 
not stigmatized because of their health status or circumstances.85 Not least of all 
because this increases peoples’ reluctance to divulge private information, 
impeding future data collection.86 
The professional culture of clinicians can determine the types of data that 
are collected, particularly when that data might be considered subjective.87 In 
Saudi Arabia, there were certain hospital practices that were identified as 
problematic by physicians and public health specialists from other countries, but 
some Saudi physicians did not see these as unusual or worthy of questioning.88 
This situation highlights the importance of having outsiders actively 
participating in the outbreak response: some information will only be identifiable 
and therefore deemed worthy of collection by people not already accustomed to 
the affected country’s professional and clinical norms.89  
e. Press Controls 
The news media is the primary means of informing the public about an 
unfolding health situation and, when at its best, can be a formidable education 
tool. While social media networks are now providing direct avenues of 
communication between public health authorities and the general population, 
these outlets still do not have the reach and impact of the mass media.90 Scientific 
and clinical advances are often reported through the popular news media and 
more specialized scientific and medical news outlets.91 Media reports also act as 
a source of essential data for public health authorities, including the WHO and 
the United States’ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).92 Big data 
 
 81.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 8. 
 82.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 8. 
 83.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 8. 
 84.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 8. 
 85.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 8. 
 86.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 8. 
 87.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 8. 
 88.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 8. 
 89.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 8. 
 90.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 6. 
 91.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 6-7. 
 92.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 7. 
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aggregating tools such as the Global Public Health Intelligence Network 
(GPHIN), maintained by the Public Health Agency of Canada, analyzes around 
20,000 online news reports daily.93 Media reports are also collated by ProMED-
mail with email alerts sent to subscribers.94 Media reports can therefore be seen 
as both a vital source of data for public health stakeholders around the world 
(including clinicians, epidemiologists, data scientists and policy experts) and as 
an outlet for data and information generated by researchers, clinicians and public 
health authorities.95 
The lack of a free press in Saudi Arabia was a major barrier to data sharing 
during the MERS-CoV outbreak and research response.96 In their 2012 Freedom 
of the Press report, the independent media watchdog organization, Freedom 
House reported: 
The media environment in Saudi Arabia remained among the most 
repressive in the Arab world, and in 2011, the government moved to 
tighten the reins on the already heavily censored and state-dominated 
press.97  
Additionally, in 2011, a royal decree amending press freedoms in Saudi 
Arabia criminalized any criticism of Saudi senior religious figures and 
government officials.98 Furthermore, in 2012, all daily newspapers in Saudi 
Arabia were “controlled by individuals affiliated with the royal family” and 
broadcast media stations were under government control.99 While the internet 
and satellite television provided access to some international media outlets, “the 
Saudi government has been known to directly censor both local and international 
media.”100  
Our case study revealed that the absence of trustworthy information from 
official sources and the lack of a free press in Saudi Arabia created an increased 
 
 93. MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 7 (citing to Marie Dion et al., Big Data and the 
Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN), 41 CANADA COMMUNICABLE DISEASE REP 209 
(2015)). 
 94.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 7. 
 95.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 7. 
 96.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 7. 
 97. MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 7 (citing to Saudi Arabia, Freedom of the Press 2012, 
FREEDOM HOUSE (2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/11/07/Saudi%20Arabia_2.pdf). 
 98. MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 7 (citing to Saudi Arabia, Freedom of the Press 2012, 
FREEDOM HOUSE (2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/11/07/Saudi%20Arabia_2.pdf). 
 99. MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 7 (citing to Saudi Arabia, Freedom of the Press 2012, 
FREEDOM HOUSE (2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/11/07/Saudi%20Arabia_2.pdf). 
 100. MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 7 (citing to Saudi Arabia, Freedom of the Press 2012, 
FREEDOM HOUSE (2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/11/07/Saudi%20Arabia_2.pdf). 
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dependence on informal channels of information, including through personal and 
professional contacts and social media.101 It also highlighted contextual 
differences which may impede the flow of information.102 For instance, in Saudi 
Arabia there is not a robust norm of critically examining the official statements 
of government departments.103 News stories from Saudi media outlets in the 
early days of the outbreak were often verbatim reproductions of official 
government press releases.104 During public health emergencies news reporting 
is an important communications tool and a vital data input to disease detection 
programs and digital epidemiological research.105 It also influences how much 
attention a particular issue will receive by the public and politicians.106 
Therefore, freedom of the press is vitally important for effective data sharing in 
public health emergencies.107 
III. EBOLA 
This Part will describe the origin of the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa, the early gaps in data collection and sharing that followed its detection, 
and the ensuing barriers to sharing data relevant to researching the new pathogen 
and responding to the infectious disease emergency. These barriers included 
proprietary claims over the virus and related genetic material, disparities in 
approaches to patient privacy and informed consent, and a lack of legal 
infrastructure for data sharing. The West Africa Ebola episode identifies factors 
that were specific to the biomedical innovation process as well as the 
responsibilities of governments in the context of sharing data during infectious 
disease emergencies. 
a. Background 
On December 6, 2013, Emile Ouamouno, a 2-year-old from Meliandou, a 
small village in the Guinea forestière, died after four days of suffering from 
vomiting, fever, and black stool.108  The cause of his infection is unknown, 
although he is now widely considered to be the index case for the outbreak of 
Ebola hemorrhagic fever now, “Ebola Virus Disease” (EVD).109  Within a 
 
 101.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 7. 
 102.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 7. 
 103.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 7. 
 104.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 7. 
 105.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 7. 
 106.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 7. 
 107.  MERS-CoV Case Study, supra note 8, at 7. 
 108.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 1 (citing to Michelle Roberts, First Ebola Boy 
Likely Infected by Playing in Bat Tree, BBC NEWS (Dec. 30, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/health-
30632453). 
 109.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 1. 
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month, the child’s sister, mother, and grandmother died after experiencing 
similar symptoms.110 The funeral for the latter was attended by a midwife who 
passed the disease to relatives in another village, and to a health care worker 
treating her.111  That health care worker was treated at a hospital in Macenta, 
about 80 kilometers (50 miles) east. Additionally, a doctor who treated her also 
contracted Ebola.112  The doctor then passed it to his brothers in Kissidougou, 
133 kilometers (83 miles) away.113 
Although the outbreak of EVD originated in Guinea, between December 
2013 and March 2014, it spread more rapidly in the eastern regions of Sierra 
Leone and then in North Central Liberia, followed by Nzérékoré in Guinea.114 
Between December 2013 and April  2016, a total of 28,616 suspected, probable, 
and confirmed cases of EVD were reported.115 A total of 11,310 deaths were 
attributed to the outbreak.116 The largest numbers of cases and deaths occurred 
in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, but 36 cases were reported from Italy, Mali, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.117 After 
reaching a peak of 950 confirmed cases per week in September 2014, the 
incidence dropped precipitously toward the end of that year. 118 
Epidemiological investigations have revealed that primary human 
infections with the Ebola virus are associated with the handling of infected 
chimpanzees, gorillas, fruit bats, monkeys, forest antelope, and porcupines.119 
Human-to-human transmission of Ebola occurs through close and direct physical 
contact with infected bodily fluids, the most infectious being blood, feces and 
vomit.120 Funeral practices in the region that involved touching and washing dead 
 
 110. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 1 (citing to Mohamed F. Jalloh et 
al., Assessments of Ebola knowledge, Attitudes and Practices in Forécariah, Guinea and Kambia, Sierra 
Leone, July–August 2015, 372 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. B. (2017)). 
 111. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 1; see also Holly Yan & Esprit Smith, Ebola: 
Who Was Patient Zero? Disease Traced Back to 2-year-old in Guinea, CNN (Jan. 21, 2015, 6:40 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2014/10/28/health/ebola-patient-zero/index.html.  
 112.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 1. 
 113. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 1 (citing to Holly Yan & Esprit Smith, Ebola: 
Who Was Patient Zero? Disease Traced Back to 2-year-old in Guinea, CNN (Jan. 21, 2015, 6:40 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2014/10/28/health/ebola-patient-zero/index.html). 
 114. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 1 (citing to WHO Ebola Response Team,  After 
Ebola in West Africa - Unpredictable Risks, Preventable Epidemics, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED., 587 
(2016)). 
 115. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 1 (citing to WHO Ebola Response Team,  After 
Ebola in West Africa - Unpredictable Risks, Preventable Epidemics, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED., 587 
(2016)). 
 116. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 1. 
 117.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 1. 
 118.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 1. 
 119. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 1; see also Ebola Virus Disease, WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, (May 30, 2019), http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/ebola-virus-
disease. 
 120.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 1. 
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bodies as well as the unsanitary conditions in many healthcare facilities 
magnified the risks of human-to-human transmission in the infection, treatment, 
and death cycles.121  The 2014-16 outbreak was the 24th known outbreak of 
Ebola and by far the most severe.122 A new outbreak occurred in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) in May, 2017 and then the following year on April 4, 
2018.123 On August 1, 2018, a new outbreak occurred in North Kivu province, 
DRC, on the other side of the country from the April outbreak.124  With a case 
fatality rate of around 55%, and with only two vaccines licensed by stringent 
regulatory authorities Ebola remains a biomedical research priority.125 
Much remains unknown about Ebola.126 Even after nearly 30 outbreaks, 
scientists still do not know what explains the pathogenicity of the virus, or the 
exact route of zoonotic transmission.127 Fruit bats appear to be the “most likely 
source of animal-to-human transmission,” although their exact role in the 
transmission cycle is still unclear.128  
b. Proprietary and Attribution 
As with MERS-CoV, contentions surrounded the accessing and sharing of 
EVD virus samples in 2014-16. Thousands of Ebola samples were transferred 
out of the three most affected countries, largely without the consent of patients, 
and categorically without the consent of their governments, between April and 
November 2014.129 While two teams of researchers made 102 Ebola genome 
sequences public between April and June of that year, there was a three-month 
span in which no new virus sequences were made available, even though some 
 
 121. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 1; see also MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, 
PUSHED TO THE LIMIT AND BEYOND: A YEAR INTO THE LARGEST EVER EBOLA OUTBREAK, (Mar. 23, 
2015), https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/sites/usa/files/msf143061.pdf. 
 122. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 1; see also Jonathan Corum, A History of Ebola 
in 24 Outbreaks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2014),  
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/12/30/science/history-of-ebola-in-24-outbreaks.html. . 
 123. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 1 (citing to WHO HEALTH EMERGENCY 
PROGRAM, EBOLA VIRUS DISEASE: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO EXTERNAL SITUATION REPORT 
15 (July 12, 2018), 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/273088/SITREP_EVD_DRC_20180712-eng.pdf?ua=1). 
 124.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9 at 1-2. 
 125. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 2 (citing to Ana Maria Henao-Restrepo et al., 
Efficacy and Effectiveness of an rVSV-Vectored Vaccine Expressing Ebola Surface Glycoprotein: 
Interim Results from the Guinea Ring Vaccine Cluster-Randomised Trail, 386 LANCENT 857 (2015)). 
 126.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 2. 
 127. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 2; see also Robert A. Lever & Christopher J. M. 
Whitty, Ebola Virus Disease: Emergence, Outbreak and Future Directions, 117 BRIT. MED. 
BULL. 95,98-99 (2016). 
 128.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 2. 
 129.  See West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 8-9 (highlighting issues related to 
biological samples). 
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samples were known to have been sequenced.130 In many cases, the whereabouts 
of the Ebola virus samples that were taken from the countries of origin and 
resulting research data conducted upon them remains unknown.131   
Our case study revealed that during the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak, data was 
largely regarded as proprietary even if a large number of stakeholders invoked a 
“moral imperative” for free and open data sharing due to its importance for the 
response.132 Researchers were reluctant to share data to prevent other researchers 
from using their work without attribution.133 Indeed, researchers were so 
mistrustful of sharing data with one another that they largely relied upon a single 
biologist at the University of Edinburgh to verify their results. Researchers also 
cited the risk of misuse of data as a reason not to share data.134 
In August 2014, an advisory panel convened by the Director-General of 
WHO determined that using Ebola products not yet tested on humans was ethical 
given the devastating nature of the emergency.135 In 2015, trials for the 
experimental treatments favipiravir and convalescent plasma took place in 
Guinea, as did trials for brincidofovir in Liberia. The trial for rVSV-EBOV 
vaccine started in Guinea in March 2015.136 
Biomedical firms, largely working from research funded by Canadian and 
U.S. militaries, accelerated the development of therapeutics and vaccines.137 
Several firms worked in partnership with the ministries of health of the affected 
countries, including the WHO, the U.S. National Institute for Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases (NIAID), and the Norwegian Institute of Public Health.138 
The evidence showing the impact of intellectual property concerns on data 
sharing was mixed.139 A retrospective assessment by WHO authors noted that:  
 
 130.  See West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9. 
 131. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 8. 
 132. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 11. 
 133. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 11 (citing to Declan Butler & David Cyranoski, 
Flu Papers Spark Row Over Credit for Data, NATURE (May 1, 2013), https://www.nature.com/news/flu-
papers-spark-row-over-credit-for-data-1.12901); see also Ben Goldacre et al., WHO Consultation on 
Data and Results Sharing During Public Health Emergencies. CENTRE FOR EVIDENCE-BASED MED. 8-9 
(Sept. 2015), http://www.who.int/medicines/ebola-
treatment/background_briefing_on_data_results_sharing_during_phes.pdf. 
 134. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 12 (citing to First Diagnostic Test for Ebola 
Accepted by Who, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.who.int/medicines/news/1st_diagnostic_test_ebola/en/); see also Matthew Brack & Tito 
Castillo, Data Sharing for Public Health Emergencies: Key Lessons from Other Sectors, CHATHAM 
HOUSE, 6 (Apr. 2015). 
 135.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 12. 
 136.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 12. 
 137.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 12. 
 138. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 12; see also William W. Fisher III & Katrina 
Geddes, Learning from Ebola: How Drug-Development Policy Could Help Stop Outbreaks of Infectious 
Diseases, BERKMAN KLEIN CENTER, https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/Learning_from_Ebola.pdf. 
 139.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 12. 
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[T]rials of two Ebola vaccine candidates (ChAd3-ZEBOV and rVSV-
ZEBOV) benefited greatly from an open collaboration between 
investigators and institutions in Africa, Europe, and North America. 
These teams, coordinated by the WHO, were able to generate and 
exchange critical data for the development of urgently needed novel 
vaccines along faster timelines than have ever before been 
achieved.140 
However, a story published by ScienceInsider argued that at least one company 
“dragg[ed] its feet” because it was “worried about losing control over the 
development of the vaccine.”141 Firms asserted that protection of data and trade 
secrets was necessary for potential future intellectual property and related 
commercial claims.142   
The use of trade secrets and other proprietary claims were also applicable 
to “negative” and inconclusive results.143 For example, one promising treatment 
was tested in Guinea and Sierra Leone, yet, when it did not show efficacy, 
enrollment in the clinical trial was halted, without further data as to why.144 
Similarly, another firm would not publicly reveal why it withdrew support for a 
trial of a second treatment in late January after four patients had been treated, 
despite this information being useful to other parties conducting R&D in the 
field.145 Similarly, the experimental drug ZMapp was given to a handful of 
patients before supplies ran out in August 2014, however, detailed information 
on patients’ reactions to the drug was not released, owing to fears that this would 
prevent researchers from publishing on the cases.146  While data were shared in 
the context of experimental vaccines, this was largely because firms needed the 
 
 140. Kayvon Modjarrad, et al., Developing Global Norms for Sharing Data and Results During 
Public Health Emergencies, 13 PLOS MED. 1, 2  (Jan. 5, 2016), 
https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001935&type=printable; 
see also West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 12. 
 141. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 12 (citing to William W. Fisher III & Katrina 
Geddes, Learning from Ebola: How Drug-Development Policy Could Help Stop Outbreaks of Infectious 
Diseases, BERKMAN KLEIN CENTER, 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/Learning_from_Ebola.pdf). 
 142. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 12 (citing to William W. Fisher III & Katrina 
Geddes, Learning from Ebola: How Drug-Development Policy Could Help Stop Outbreaks of Infectious 
Diseases, BERKMAN KLEIN CENTER, 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/Learning_from_Ebola.pdf). 
 143. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 13. 
 144. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 13; see also Andrew Pollack, Clinical Trial of 
Experimental Ebola Drug is Halted, N.Y.  TIMES (June 19, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/20/health/clinical-trial-of-experimental-ebola-drug-is-halted.html. 
 145. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 13; see also Erika Check Hayden, Ebola 
Teaches Tough Lessons about Rapid Research, NATURE (May 27, 2015), 
https://www.nature.com/news/ebola-teaches-tough-lessons-about-rapid-research-1.17623. 
 146. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 13 (citing to Erika Check Hayden, Ebola 
Teaches Tough Lessons about Rapid Research, NATURE (May 27, 2015), 
https://www.nature.com/news/ebola-teaches-tough-lessons-about-rapid-research-1.17623). 
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infrastructure that only governments, funding agencies, and the largest charities 
could provide.147 Those stakeholders insisted on sharing as a condition of 
access.148   
c. The Publishing Imperative 
As discussed in Part II (c),149 one of the fundamental dilemmas for 
researchers with primarily academic affiliations is in the incentive structure for 
tenure, promotion, pay, and status.  Release of preliminary data might not only 
subject the researcher to later criticism if the data were erroneous or flawed, but  
may also jeopardize his or her opportunity to publish the data in peer review 
journals that satisfy tenure and promotion criteria.150 Delays and barriers to data 
sharing of relevant Ebola information included the time taken by authors to 
prepare, write and submit their papers; desire to first submit results to high profile 
journals; time taken by journals to review and make decisions about publication; 
and time taken to complete the publication process.151 
These delays applied to all data related to the research response including 
epidemiological, surveillance, emergency response, health facility data, 
pathogen genome data, research data including surveys, observational studies, 
clinical trials of diagnostics, therapeutics and preventives, quality controlled 
interim results, final research results, and inconclusive results.152  Measurement 
of this delay has been far more robust for clinical trial data.153 For clinical trials 
related to Ebola, the median publication lag-time (from the end of the study) was 
338 days (range of 157–621 days), the median submission lag-time (from study 
end to submission to the journal where it was eventually published) was 297 days 
(116–450 days), and the median review lag-time (from submission to 
publication) was 178 days (137–193 days).154  
Currently, there are few mainstream efforts to address these barriers during 
public health emergencies.155 Publishing research takes time, and the peer review 
 
 147.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 13. 
 148.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 13. 
 149.  See supra Part II.c. 
 150. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 13 (citing to Matthew Brack & Tito Castillo, 
Data Sharing For Public Health Emergencies: Key Lessons From Other Sectors, CHATHAM HOUSE 
(Apr. 2015), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150417DataSharingPu
blicHealthLessonsBrackCastillo.pdf.). 
 151.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 13. 
 152.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 13. 
 153.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 13. 
 154. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 14 (citing to Piero L. Olliaro, Initiation and 
Publication Time-Lags of Treatment Trials for Ebola Virus Disease, 18 THE LANCET: INFECTIOUS 
DISEASE 28 (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(17)30698-
9/fulltext). 
 155. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 14. 
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process is often not expedited during public health emergencies (although many 
interviewees in the MERS-CoV context were impressed with the expedited effort 
many journals made).156 The earliest published genomic analyses of the Ebola 
outbreak, crucial for determining where it originated and how it was transmitted, 
did not appear until August, 2014.157 This is a long-standing problem. For 
example, during the 2003 SARS outbreak, an estimated 22% of research studies 
relating to SARS were submitted to journals, and only 7% were published.158 
The failure to provide or share timely relevant data has been cited as one of 
the key impediments to mounting an effective response to the Ebola outbreak.159 
Although the outbreak was eventually contained, data sharing and 
communication breakdowns contributed to a significant delay in 
acknowledgment about the outbreak’s severity and corresponding response.160  
d. Patient Privacy and Informed Consent 
Where Ebola treatment centers were established (in both rural areas as well 
as in and around larger cities) and in the context of formalized healthcare 
facilities like hospitals, patient confidentiality and informed consent posed 
challenges for biomedical and clinical researchers.161 In the case of Ebola, these 
matters became even more relevant given that individual treatment and the public 
health response were significantly intertwined - sequencing of the Ebola virus 
strain enabled researchers to trace the outbreak’s origin and pattern of 
transmission.162 Because people exposed to Ebola showed variability in their 
 
 156.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 14. 
 157.  West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 14. 
 158. West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 14 (citing to aura Merson et al., Trust, Respect, 
and Reciprocity: Informing Culturally Appropriate Data-Sharing Practice in Vietnam, J. OF EMPIRICAL 
RESEARCH ON HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS (Aug. 21, 2015), 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1556264615592387). 
 159. See Jean-Paul Chretien et al., Make Data Sharing Routine to Prepare for Public Health 
Emergencies, 13 PLOS MED. (Aug. 16, 2016), 
https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002109 (highlighting obstacles 
to data sharing during public health emergencies); see also West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, 
at 2. 
 160.  See West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 2 (citing to Pushed to the Limit and 
Beyond: a Year Into the Largest Ever Ebola Outbreak, DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS (2015), 
https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/sites/usa/files/msf143061.pdf 
(last accessed July 24, 2018)). 
 161.  See West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 10. 
 162. See West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 10 (citing to Stephen K. Gire et al., 
Genomic Surveillance Elucidates Ebola Virus Origin and Transmission During The 2014 Outbreak, 345 
AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI. 1369,  (Sept. 12, 2014), 
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/345/6202/1369.full.pdf). 
03 HALABI (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/2021  6:56 PM 
222 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 23:2 
susceptibility to infection and disease severity, human genetic variation likely 
contributed to individual immunity and infectivity.163  
Much of the research relevant to the development of diagnostics, 
therapeutics, and vaccines would not be possible without the collection and 
sharing of human genomic data.164 In the three most affected countries, genomic 
data was in some cases collected and labeled with a patient’s identifiable 
information (name, age, sex, etc.).165 Data could then be theoretically de-
identified, but all mechanisms for protecting sensitive health data were 
rudimentary (e.g., locked file cabinets) or non-existent.166   
The sensitivity of data collected from patients posed a dilemma for 
researchers: either obtain informed consent and respect confidentiality according 
to ethical guidelines or facilitate data sharing for purposes of response.167 
Concern over the confidentiality of data about individuals was the single most 
consistently cited barrier to data sharing.168 These concerns led many researchers 
to hesitate or refuse to share data that might compromise patient 
confidentiality.169 In the Ebola context, researchers saw firsthand the 
discrimination faced by both infected persons and survivors, as well as their 
families.170 The Liberian Ministry of Health, for example, mandated that no 
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RESPONSE (Sept. 30, 2016), 
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THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES,  PRIVACY IN ETHICS AND EBOLA: PUBLIC HEALTH PLANNING AND 
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 166. See West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 10. 
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and Clinical Practice, 6 GENOME MEDICINE (Nov. 18, 2014), 
https://genomemedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13073-014-0106-2). 
 168. See West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 10 (citing to Ben Goldacre et al., WHO 
Consultation on Data and Results Sharing During Public Health Emergencies. CENTRE FOR EVIDENCE-
BASED MED. 9 (Sept. 2015), http://www.who.int/medicines/ebola-
treatment/background_briefing_on_data_results_sharing_during_phes.pdf). 
 169. See West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 10 (citing to Susan Bull et al., Best 
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Settings, J. OF EMPIRICAL RES. ON HUM. RES. ETHICS 306 (Aug. 21, 2015), 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1556264615594606). 
 170. See West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 10 (citing to Gail Geller et al., Genomics 
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and Clinical Practice, 6 GENOME MEDICINE (Nov. 18, 2014), 
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names be released and no bodies photographed.171 Some early genomic analyses 
admitted that informed consent had not been obtained.172 There were widespread 
ambiguities as to whether patients had to consent to downstream uses of their 
data.173 Repeat consent delayed further research and exposed patients to 
additional risk of stigmatization.174  Many patients were incapacitated and/or 
were minors whose parents had died and their guardianship became a complex 
matter of family, village, or tribal affiliation.175 All of these unresolved issues 
contributed to hesitation and refusal to share data during the Ebola outbreak.176  
e. The Lack of Legal Infrastructure for Data Sharing  
The structure of data sharing was mediated through entities employed by 
major funders: the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the CDC, the CDC 
Foundation, U.K. Department for International Development (DFID), the Paul 
Allen Foundation, the U.K. Government, and USAID among the most 
significant.177 These entities operated under agreements that variously limited or 
prohibited data sharing, required open data sharing, specified avenues for data 
sharing, or left the matter of data sharing ambiguous and unpredictable. Entities 
hired to collect, analyze, or work with some forms of data generally did not share 
that data outside contractual obligations or financial incentives to do so.178 
“Without agreement about the mutually beneficial roles, responsibilities, and 
legitimate contributions of clinicians, scientists, and public health authorities, 
parties end up either encroaching on one another or not communicating.”179  
These practices are reflected in the retrospective reports entities drafted for 
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donors and others, emphasizing a number of geographic locations in which there 
was a presence, number of volunteers trained, and number of staff hired.180  One 
report listed 78 partners and 36 sub-grantees.181 
Some funders like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and UK DFID 
made explicit data sharing and data accessibility requirements, although the 
commitment is broadly to openness after publication.182 The arrangement 
between the CDC and one logistics support entity changed depending upon the 
program officer who had rotated into the field (every four weeks), with each 
program officer in turn making different decisions on data sharing.183 Entities or 
persons collecting and/or analyzing data would claim that specific agreements 
under which they worked prohibited data sharing except to specific persons or 
ministries.184 
With respect to clinical trial data collected following the WHO’s August 
11, 2014 declaration on emergency uses of products not yet tested in humans, 
the coordination between the WHO, NIAID, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), 
ministries of health in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the Norwegian 
Research Council, IRDC Canada, donors, and universities minimized data 
sharing barriers.185  This coordination was attributed to agreements that clearly 
defined roles, transparent and agreed-upon categories of data needed for the trials 
to show evidence of safety and efficacy, and adequate resources to enroll 
volunteers, conduct trials, and gather information.186   
IV. SOLUTIONS 
Based on our two case studies, we advocate four specific solutions to the 
legal, social and ethical barriers to data sharing during public health emergencies. 
First, create a system of contractually-driven incentives that value data, even 
preliminary data, and financially reward data sharing and/or punish data 
hoarding. Second, establish a trusted third-party repository where researchers 
may post data with a meaningful mechanism to address non-attribution, along 
the lines of the global initiative on sharing avian influenza data GISAID 
database for influenza researchers.187 Third, the WHO should lead an effort to 
 
 180. See West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 14. 
 181. See West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 14 (citing to USAID, Social Mobilization 
Lessons Learned: The Ebola Response in Liberia, JOHNS HOPKINS CTR. FOR COMM’N PROGRAMS 50–52 
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 185. See West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 15. 
 186. See West Africa Ebola Case Study, supra note 9, at 15. 
 187. See Stefan Elbe & Gemma Buckland-Merrett, Data, Disease and Diplomacy: GISAID’s 
Innovative Contribution to Global Health, 1 GLOBAL CHALLENGES 33,  (Jan. 10, 2017), 
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establish guidelines and procedures for protecting patient privacy and 
confidentiality during public health emergencies.  Fourth, expand informal 
networks of researchers, aid workers, and public health responders, through 
which much of the (limited) data sharing occurred during both emergencies.   
Reform begins with the three sets of stakeholders best positioned to shape 
the legal, social and ethical environment for data sharing during infectious 
disease emergencies: (1) governments, (2) funders, and (3) medical journals. 
Governments should commit through a World Health Assembly Resolution to a 
statement that rapid sharing of data is critical to preserve global health and to 
prioritize rapid sharing over other interests. This would help clarify ambiguities 
in current international law about whether sovereign ownership of relevant data 
changes during public health emergencies.   
This Resolution should also recommend international funding of a 
comprehensive disease database, where persons, and not organizations, must 
register and acknowledge use of others’ research. Adopting GISAID’s 
requirement that database users be natural persons (as opposed to organizational 
entities) would facilitate formal and informal networks that have been crucial to 
breaking down sharing barriers in previous infectious disease emergencies.188   
Establishing an international database would further allow funders to 
identify researchers, their promised benefits, and develop a taxonomy and system 
for rewarding the posting of relevant data for other researchers to use. Indeed, 
funders could expand already existing requirements for recipients to publish in 
open-access journals. 
Finally, medical journals should expand their gatekeeping role, requiring 
expanded disclosures as to sources of data, attribution, and ethical use of material 
transfer agreements. Indeed, these journals already have an existing mechanism 
for doing so; they request Institutional Review Board approval information 
before publishing data involving human research subjects. Leveraging the 
influence of journals to protect the integrity of the research process would orient 
researchers toward better data management practices. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Legal, social and ethical barriers to data sharing threaten global health and 
will continue to do so as novel pathogens emerge. Developing incentives, 
facilitating networks, and creating a centralized data resource are critical steps in 
responding to, and containing the next infectious disease emergency. Here, we 
outlined the results of our case studies into data sharing in the 2012 MERS-CoV 
 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/gch2.1018 (pointing out that GISAID is working on an 
influenza repository). 
 188.  See Questionnaire for Databases, WHO, 7 
https://www.who.int/influenza/pip/DBSubmission_GISAID.pdf?ua=1 (last updated Aug. 2018). 
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outbreak in Saudi Arabia189 and the 2014-16 West Africa Ebola public health 
emergency.190 Our case studies revealed that proprietary claims and concerns 
about attribution are major barriers to data sharing. Unfortunately, the ongoing 
COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated that proprietary and attribution claims 
continue to create barriers to data sharing during infectious disease emergencies. 
There is evidence that the sharing requirements related to both information and 
biological samples created barriers to accessing novel coronavirus samples from 
China in the early days of the pandemic.191 There are ongoing discussions at the 
World Trade Organization as to whether poorer countries should be able to 
obtain exemptions from vaccine licensing fees applicable under the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), 
and early online publishing of preprints, while generally providing a net positive 
for the scientific and policy community, have also contributed to the spread of 
misinformation (and perhaps even disinformation) when very little was known 
about the virus. The sorts of analyses conducted in 2018 with the support of the 
Wellcome Trust and the GloPID-R will need to be repeated in the aftermath of 
COVID-19 to determine what lessons can be drawn from this global catastrophe. 
While the initial stages of an epidemic (especially from a previously 
unknown agent) are always characterized by alarm and confusion, there should 
be no need to reinvent the data-sharing wheel every time the world is faced with 
another infectious disease challenge. We can learn lessons from past outbreak 
and do more than just write about them (which does serve the important purpose 
of awareness raising). We also need governments and funders to implement these 
recommendations. The academic publishing community is getting the picture 
and changing their publication practices during emergency situations. If an 
institution as steeped in tradition as academic publishing can adapt, then there is 
hope that others can too. 
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